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This paper extends behavioural microsimulation modelling so that third round eﬀects
of a policy change can be simulated. The ﬁrst round eﬀects relate to ﬁxed hours
of work, while second round eﬀects allow for changes in desired hours of work at
unchanged wages. These allow for endogenous changes to the distribution of wage
rates resulting from the labour supply responses to tax changes. This is achieved
using the concept of an aggregate ‘supply response schedule’, which identiﬁes the
extent to which average labour supply responds to a proportional change in wage
rates. The third round eﬀect is obtained after re-running a microsimulation model
with a suitable modiﬁcation to individuals’ wage rates. The method is illustrated
using the MITTS behavioural microsimulation model.1 Introduction
Considerable progress has been made in recent years in developing behavioural mi-
crosimulation models for the analysis of employment responses to tax policy changes.
These models are partial equilibrium supply side models in which the wage rate dis-
tribution is exogenous. They are designed to examine the eﬀects on government
expenditures, taxation and labour supply, allowing for the considerable complexity
of individuals’ budget constraints and taking into account the heterogeneity of indi-
viduals, their personal circumstances and preferences.1 To restrict microsimulation
models to the supply side of the labour market is not unreasonable, given the enor-
mous diﬃculties of allowing for general equilibrium eﬀects within models that are
able to capture the degree of population heterogeneity, combined with the complex-
ity of tax and transfer systems actually in place (or the diﬃculty of allowing for
suﬃcient heterogeneity in computable general equilibrium models). However, sub-
stantial changes in labour supply as a result of a non-marginal policy change may
be expected to give rise to changes in the wage rate distribution, depending on the
demand for labour. It would therefore be desirable to have a way of accommodating
such changes, at least to some extent.2
This paper consider the question of how to take behavioural microsimulation
analysis one stage further, by anticipating the possible aggregate eﬀects of tax policy
reform on wages.3 Given a method of evaluating potential changes to the wage rate
distribution, such eﬀects can in turn be fed back into the microsimulation model in
order to obtain adjusted labour supply responses and expenditure estimates. The pro-
posed method involves a multi-stage procedure in which the simulated labour supply
eﬀects of a policy change are aggregated and combined with extraneous information
about the demand side of the labour market.4
It may be thought that a behavoural microsimulation model could be used to
generate, by a simple numerical process of aggregation, a suitable aggregate labour
1For a suvery of methods of dealing with labour supply responses in microsimulation models, see
Creedy and Duncan (2001).
2Bergmann (199) discussed microsimulation models in which aggregate unemployment is gener-
ated, resulting from job search behaviour in the presence of unemployment insurance. However, all
considerations relating to wage levels (on either supply or demand sides of the market) were ignored.
3The analysis remains static in the sense that cross-sectional information only is used and indi-
viduals are not treated as forming expectations about future wages and prices, or optimising within
a life-cycle framework
4Alternatively, it is possible to consider the suitably aggregated output from a behavioural mi-
crosimulation model as providing information which may be fed into a general equilibrium model
that is unable to deal with such population heterogeneity.
1supply schedule that could be combined with an aggregate demand function, either
estimated econometrically or generated by a general equilibrium model. However,
a straightforward correspondence between the output from a microsimulation model
and a conventionally deﬁned aggregate supply curve is not possible. A number of
aspects of the treatement of aggregate labour supply are discussed in section 2.
The procedure suggested in this paper for simulating feedback eﬀects is presented
in section 3. An example using the Melbourne Institute Tax and Transfer Simulator
(MITTS) for Australia is presented in section 4.5
2 Aggregate Labour Supply
This section discusses the problems of aggregating labour supply and explains why
no attempt is made here to produce a synthetic aggregate supply function. The ﬁrst
subsection stresses the complexities for aggregation arising from piecewise-linear bud-
get constraints. The second subsection brieﬂy discusses macroeconomic approaches
and ﬁnally the aggregation problem is formally stated.
2.1 Individual Labour Supply
The standard microeconomic approach to the analysis of labour supply involves max-
imisation of a direct utility function U(ci,h i;Xi), where hi and ci represent hours
worked and consumption (or net income, where the price index is normalised to
unity) for an individual i with characteristics Xi, which includes non-wage income,
subject to some budget constraint. This constraint is typically piecewise-linear so
the individual faces a variety of net wage rates. The actual net wage depends on the
chosen position on the budget constraint and is therefore, like the number of hours
worked, endogenous. However, an interior (tangency) solution can be regarded as if
it were generated by a linear constraint of the form
wnhi + µ = ci, (1)
where wn and µ represent the appropriate net wage rate and virtual income respec-
tively, deﬁne as the net income at hi =0 , for the relevant linear segment extended
to the axis. An interior solution takes the form, e hi = e hi (wn,µ) and is relevant for
a strictly limited range of gross wages, w. For corner solutions, the virtual wage is
used, corresponding to the slope of the indiﬀerence curve at the combination of hi
and ci. After consideration of all possible interior and corner solutions generated by
5The MITTS model is described in Creedy, Duncan, Harris and Scutella (2002).
2a piecewise linear tax function, the individual’s labour supply function, deﬁned over
the whole range of variation in the gross wage, w, takes the general form
h
∗
i = h(w;Xi,T), (2)
where T refers to the complete tax and transfer system which generates the nonlin-
ear constraints facing individuals.6 The shape of this function is not straightforward,
though it is made up of segments based on the form e hi (wn,µ). The nonlinearity of
budget constraints gives rise to individual labour supply functions displaying consid-
erable variation in the wage elasticity of hours supplied. Explicit consideration must
be given to the extensive margin (at which movements into or out of employment oc-
cur) and the intensive margin (involving changes in the level of hours worked among
those employed).7 This raises severe problems for aggregation, as can be seen by
considering an individual supply function.
It is important to distinguish between the wage elasticity deﬁned with reference
to the gross wage and that in terms of the net wage. The latter is most often reported
in empirical microeconometric studies of labour supply, but the former is the more
useful concept, taking full account of the endogeneity of the net wage. To illustrate,





The parameter β1 > 0 represents the constant wage elasticity for this model. If
the individual faces a simple linear budget constraint, the function e hi (w,µ) gives
an accurate description of the hours responses to a change in the wage rate, for all
w>w 0,w h e r e b yhi > 0.
To show the distorting eﬀects of a nonlinear tax and transfer schedule on an os-
tensibly constant elasticity model of labour supply, suppose individuals face a three-
segment piecewise-linear budget constraint.9 They also incur ﬁxed costs when work-
6The function must ideally be consistent with utility maximisation, allowing for the fact that
individuals may be simulated to change the number of hours worked quite considerably in response to
some policy reform. A ﬁrst requirement is that (2) satisﬁes the integrability conditions. As derived
by Hurwitz and Uzawa (1971), these require (for necessity and suﬃciency) the Slutsky matrix to
be symmetric and negative semi-deﬁnite; for further discussion, see Deaton and Muellbauer (1980,
pp.89-93) and Stern (1986, pp.145-146). This requires the wage response of the compensated labour
supply to be non-negative; that is, ∂h
∂w − h∂h
∂µ ≥ 0.
7Heckman (1993) considered that in examining welfare reforms, the extensive margin is the more
important.
8This labour supply function is consistent with a homothetic preference speciﬁcation.
9Such kinks might occur, for example, if a higher tax rate applies when earnings exceed some
threshold amount, say E.








indiﬀerence map (linear taxes)
c
















h* = h(w0| T=T 1)
h* = h(w| T=T 1)
h* (min)









wage elasticity (nonlinear taxes)
4ing. The labour supply function h∗
i = h(w;Xi,T) is discontinous at the point of entry
into the labour market. Furthermore, for certain wage rate intervals which place the
worker on one of the kinks in the budget constraint, the relationship between wages
and hours is negative.10 Hence the net wage elasticity bears only a loose resemblance
to the eﬀect of a proportionate gross wage change, given the nonlinearities of the
budget schedule. This type of phenomenon is illustrated by the various ﬁgures in
Table 1. The method proposed below is fully able to deal with these responses at the
individual level.
2.2 Aggregate Supply Functions
The conditions under which aggregate observations on labour supply and commodity
demands, as functions of some index of prices and wages, can be regarded as being
consistent with individual optimisation, are very strong. For example, the use of a
representative agent framework was examined in detail by Deaton and Muellbauer
(1980) and, in the context of labour supply in particular, by Muellbauer (1981).
Furthermore, the conditions obtained by Muellbauer abstract from corner solutions
which, as shown above, are of fundamental importance in microsimulation modelling
in view of the piecewise-linearity of budget constraints in practice.
In models of labour supply based on aggregate time series data, it is therefore
extremely diﬃcult to deal appropriately with heterogeneity, either of individual cir-
cumstances or of responses to policy reform. Most aggregate studies tend to be
based on the presumption that individual heterogeneity of responses ‘average out’
in aggregate, to leave a pure price, tax or wage response to a change in economic
circumstances. Such an argument is entirely pragmatic.
An example of the treatment of aggregate labour supply in macroecomic models
which are underpinned by a microeconomic foundation in optimising behaviour is
provided by the intertemporal substitution model, following the early work of Lucas
and Rapping (1969).11 The model is based on the argument that individuals form ex-
pectations about future real wages, in relation to current wages, based on movements
in commodity prices. If real wages are considered to be high relative to expected
future wages, current labour supply increases as a result of intertemporal substitu-
tion. Individual behaviour is thus explicitly linked to a life-cycle labour supply and
commodity demand model. The degree of intertemporal substitution thereby aﬀects
10This happens because hours are adjusted down as wages increase, in order for the individual to
remain on some earnings threshold, so that w.h = E.
11For examples, see also Altonji (1982, 1986). Kennan (1988) examines identiﬁcation issues in
detail.
5the variability in labour supply, and therefore unemployment, over time. Empirical
aggregate supply schedules are estimated using time series data on variables such as
average hours, real wage rates, and tax payments. However, these models rely on a
single individual, involving no explicit treatment of aggregation issues.12
2.3 Aggregating Labour Supply
To see how aggregation problems arise, consider again the individual labour supply
function (2) presented above. At the observed wage of wi for person i, the predicted
labour supply when faced with tax system T = T0 is
h
∗
i(wi)=h(wi;Xi,T = T0) (4)
One approach to aggregating individual labour supplies might be to predict and
sum (or average) such labour supply predictions over a range of wage rages, with
each individual being presented with the same wage rate. Using sample weights gi
(representing the number of individuals of type i in the population), this would result








at some common wage w. However, the interpretation of a function which returns
the average of a set of individual labour supplies on the presumption that all are
given the same wage is unclear. In practice, it would involve predictions of individual
labour supplies at wage rates far from their observed wage wi. It may be possible
to alleviate the second problem by weighting the average to reﬂect the distance of w
from each observed wage wi using some weighting function K(.)13. This alternative










K [b−1(w − wi)]
Pn
i=1 K [b−1(w − wi)]
¶
, (6)
for some smoothing parameter b.14
Instead of attempting to deﬁne and obtain an aggregate supply function in which
total (or average) labour supply is related to some given single or homogeneous wage
12Discussion of the extensive or intensive margin usually involves simply the use in the econo-
metric modelling of either changes in average hours worked or changes over time in the number of
individuals; see, for example, Alogoskouﬁs (1987).
13One possibe choice might be a continuous, symmetric kernel function K(u) with characteristics
K0(0) = 0 and
R
K(u)du =1 .
14The smoothing parameter b would control the rate at which the weight function K(.) falls as
the distance of w from wi increases.
6rate (considered for example as a measure of location of the wage rate distribution),
the approach suggested in this paper is to give up the objective of producing an
aggregate function. Instead, a ‘supply response schedule’ is deﬁn e di naw a yw h i c h
measures how labour supply responds to shifts in the distribution of wage rates. This
supply response schedule is an entirely numerical construction, based on simulated
labour supply responses to wage changes, conditional on a given tax and transfer
structure. The supply responses are based on optimising behaviour, allowing for the
full complexity of budget constraints and population heterogeneity.
3 A Multi-stage Procedure
This section describes a multi-stage procedure used to produce ‘third round’ eﬀects
of a policy change to the tax and transfer system, allowing for the eﬀects on the
distribution of wages. First the concept of the supply response schedule is deﬁned.
Further subsections describe the various stages involved, shifts in the schedule and
the measurement of wage eﬀects.
3.1 The Supply Response Schedule
The computation of a supply response schedule involves several stages. First be-
havioural microsimulation methods are used to simulate individual labour supply
responses to a tax or welfare policy reform, taking full account of the detail of the
existing tax and welfare system as it aﬀects each individual. These individual labour
supply predictions may be calibrated to reﬂect closely the actual labour supply pat-
terns in a particular sample of micro data at the observed distribution of wage rates.
Next, a weighted average (using weights provided by the cross-sectional survey
used) of the individual labour supply responses is calculated. This gives one point on
an empirical supply response schedule. This aggregate measure combines individual
labour supply predictions at both the extensive and intensive margins.15
A supply response schedule, around the calibrated aggregated labour supply, is
generated by modelling individual hours responses to a proportionate change in all
observed wage rates. That is, the full wage distribution is perturbed, and the ag-
gregate labour supply response to that perturbation is obtained. The perturbation
i sb a s e do na ni n d e xiw ∈ (−1,∞) which replaces each individual’s wage wi with
an amount wi(1+iw). The aggregate schedule is then build by summing (averaging)
15It would be possible to restrict attention to the extensive margin, by predicting the number of
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Figure 1: An Aggregate Supply Response Schedule
individuals’ labour supply responses at a given index iw, giving a function, in per








i=1 gi.h(wi(1 + iw);Xi,T). (7)





i=1 gi.h(wi;Xi,T), which is a sim-
ple weighted average of predicted labour supplies at observed wage rates wi.F o r a
function h(.) which calibrates predicted hours choices to replicate (or closely approxi-
mate) observed labour supply behaviour hi, this predicted aggregate H∗
a (0) at iw =0





The advantage of this type of supply response schedule, which is quite diﬀerent
from any type of aggregate supply function, is that each point on the schedule is
consistent with a distribution of wages together with the underlying tax and transfer
scheme and population characteristics. Movement along the supply response schedule
may be presented as a shift in the entire wage distribution. This in turn can be fed
back to a microsimulation model to preserve the heterogeneity of wage rates on which
so much of the detail of microsimulation depends. A schedule of this type is shown
in Figure 1.
This is very diﬀerent from the aggregate supply schedules preduced at the macro-
economic level, as for example in the literature following Lucas and Rapping (1969),
discussed above. These models presume a single consumer who, by deﬁnition, works
at the intensive margin. If such a model were parameterised using predictions from
8the microeconometrics literature, the wage elasticity would generally be low. Empir-
ical studies of labour supply support the view that most action takes place at the
extensive margin of labour market participation, where higher elasticities of response
are typically estimated. The fact that time series estimates indicate higher elas-
ticities for aggregate models compared with microeconometric models may perhaps
result from the fact that aggregate data represent a combination of participation and
conditional hours choices.
The supply response schedule is an entirely numerical concept, as it traces the
aggregate labour supply resulting from equal proportionate changes in wage rates,
conditional on the tax and transfer system and the nature of the population. However,
it can be generated directly from a behavioural microsimulation model and provides
the information needed in order to produce appropriate feedback eﬀects of tax policy
changes.
3.2 Shifts in the Supply Response Schedule
Similar methods to those outlined above can be applied to simulate shifts in the sup-
ply response schedule resulting from a change in tax or welfare policy. Because the
supply response schedule is build from the predictions of a behavioural microsimula-
tion model, the eﬀects of an enormous range of policy reforms could be simulated.
These might include, for example, tax rate or threshold changes, adjustments in wel-
fare payment tapers, or increases in the level of family beneﬁts. The type of change
is limited only by the level of tax system detail in the microsimulation model.
Suppose there are two tax systems, denoted T0 and T1. Here T0 may represent some
benchmark tax system corresponding to a given year’s microdata, and T1 represents
the tax system following a hypothetical policy reform. Let the predicted labour
supplies of the ith individual at wage rate wi(1 + iw) under systems T0 and T1,b e
denoted respectively by h∗
i0(iw)=h(wi(1 + iw);Xi,T = T0) and h∗
i1(iw)=h(wi(1 +
iw);Xi,T = T1).By aggregating the diﬀerence between these predictions at any value
of iw in the manner of (7), a simulation of the shift in overall labour supply when













3.3 Modelling Feedback Eﬀects
For a given policy change, the standard microsimulation model can calculate the
implications for total expenditure and tax revenue, on the assumption that there are
9LS
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Figure 2: A Shift in The Aggregate Supply Response Schedule
no labour supply responses.16 It is useful to refer to such non-behavioural changes in
c o s t sa st h e‘ ﬁrst round’ eﬀects of the policy change.
The changes in costs and revenues, allowing for labour supply responses but keep-
ing the wage rate distribution ﬁxed, may be described as the ‘second round’ eﬀects of
the policy change. The second round eﬀect is equivalent to a vertical movement from
an initial supply response schedule (under T0 in Figure 2) to the revised schedule (for
T1), that is keeping iw =0 .
The previous subsection has described how a shift in the supply response schedule,
as a result of a tax and transfer policy change, can be generated. This shift can
be used, in combination with information about a corresponding aggregate demand
response schedule for labour, to generate a suitable value of iw. This value of iw is
given by the intersection between the new supply response schedule and the demand
response schedule. It can then be factored into a revised behavioural simulation to
generate a new set of labour supply responses and costs for the same tax policy
change, using a shift in the wage rate distribution. These new responses are referred
to as ‘third round’ responses.
The second round eﬀect of a tax or welfare policy reform is equivalent to the
16A number of static microsimulation models have been used to inform policy in this way. Ex-
amoples include the Institute for Fiscal Studies’ TAXBEN for the UK, the Economic and Social
Research Institute’s SWITCH model for Ireland, NATSEM’s STINMOD for Australia.
10LS,LD
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Figure 3: The Wage Response to a Shift in The Supply Response Schedule: Inelastic
Demand
interaction of the aggregate supply response schedule with an inﬁnitely elastic labour
demand response schedule, so that an increase or decrease in labour supply is ab-
sorbed with no changes in the distribution of wage rates. In the absence of further
information, it is of interest to consider the other extreme assumption of completely
inelastic demand response. That is, if aggregate supply increases following some tax
policy reform, then wages must fall proportionately in order to keep employment (ag-
gregate hours) ﬁxed at the initial level. This extreme is considered in the following
section.
3.4 Measuring Wage Eﬀects in Microsimulation
Consider the extreme assumption whereby the labour demand response schedule is
ﬁx e da ts o m el e v e lLD = LD. The shift in the aggregate supply response schedule
can be used to simulate a proportionate change in the wage distribution following a
tax policy reform. Figure 3 provides an illustration. Suppose that the tax system
shifts from T0 to T1 following a policy reform in a way which causes the aggregate
supply response schedule to shift downwards. That is,
H
∗
a(iw|T = T1) <H
∗
a(iw|T = T0)for all iw. (9)
11LS,LD
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Figure 4: The Wage Response to a Shift in The Supply Response Schedule: Flexible
Demand
Under the restriction that demand is ﬁxed at LD = LD, the supply shift increases the
distribution of wages by some measurable proportion i∗
max. This factor may then be
used to adjust each individual’s wage, before being fed back into a revised behavioural
simulation, as explained above. The result is the third round simulation in which both
labour supply and wages adjust following the introduction of some tax policy reform.
The inelastic demand assumption is an extreme case. With a ﬂexible demand
response schedule of the sort shown in Figure 4, the same inward shift in aggregate
supply produces movement both in the wage distribution and in equilibrium supply.
Under these circumstances, the third-round shift in aggregate supply corresponds to
the diﬀerence




w|T = T1) − H
∗
a(0|T = T0), (10)
where i∗
w is the diﬀerence (in iw space) in the intersections of the aggregate supply
response schedules under T0 and T1 with the aggregate demand response schedule.
The approach can also be applied to separate groups, distinguished for example
by education or occupation. This would produce a set of adjustment terms, enabling
a change in the dispersion of wage rates to be modelled. A given policy change may
produce wage increases for some groups while wages may fall for others, depending
on the labour supply and demand eﬀects.
124 An Empirical Illustration
To illustrate the use of aggregate supply response schedules in behavioural microsim-
ulation, this section shows how the Melbourne Institute Tax and Transfer Simulator
(MITTS) might be adapted to model the possible eﬀects of tax reform on labour
supply and the distribution of wage rates.17 In the absence of a labour demand re-
sponse schedule, the extreme assumption is used that labour demand is ﬁxed at the
level of the pre-reform distribution of hours. Suppose that in the Australian tax and
transfer system of January 2000, the initial income tax rate is increased from 20 per
cent to 25 per cent. The data used for these simulations are drawn from the 1997 In-
come Distribution Survey (IDS), a large sample of microdata with information on the
labour supply, wage rates and demographic characteristics of around 7,000 Australian
households.
4.1 Simulated Aggregate Supply Response Schedules
The aggregate supply response schedule for the full sample of working-age households
was constructed by aggregating individual labour supply predictions from the behav-
ioural microsimulation component, using the formulation (7). Labour supplies both
under the baseline January 2000 system, and the reform system incorporating an
increase of 5 percentage points in the basic income tax rate, were predicted. Using
calibration methods, the simulated average labour supply under the January 2000
system at the observed distribution of wages is broadly equivalent to the overall av-
erage labour supply (around 19 hours per week) observed in the data. In Figure 5,
this correponds to the point on the ﬁrst aggregate supply response schedule at which
iw =0 .V a r y i n g iw under the January 2000 system produces the aggregate supply
response schedule.
Figure 5 shows that this empirical schedule is positive and monotonic over the
range iw = {−0.5,0.7}.18 The corresponding bold line in Figure 6 translates the aggre-
gate supply responses into an empirical wage elasticity schedule. At the distribution
of wage rates observed in the data (iw =0 ) , an elasticity of around 0.62 for the full
17For further details of the MITTS model, see Creedy, Duncan, Harris and Scutella (2002).
18T h ee x t r e m e so ft h i sr a n g ef o riw cover a reduction of 50 per cent to all wage rates in the sample
(at the lower end) to an increase of 70 per cent in all wages (at the higher end). The range can
be expanded, although computationally the procedure for generating empirical supply schedules is
time-consuming. Figure 5 is a fourth-order polynomial-smoothed approximation to the empirical
supply schedule, using data from a series of simulations in which the wage distribution is increased
in steps of 5 from 50 to 170 per cent of the current distribution. The procedure in total took around
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Figure 5: Simulated Aggregate Supply Response Schedules
population is obtained, rising slightly as the distribution of wages increases beyond
the observed level before falling for larger perturbations to the wage distribution. At
lower wage rates (corresponding to negative iw), the aggregate wage elasticity falls (to
around 0.35 when all wages are halved). This decline in the aggregate wage elasticity
might be caused in part by an increased reliance on transfer payments, particularly
among low wage workers.
The formulation in (8) is used to simulate a shift in the aggregate supply response
schedule following an increase of 5 percentage points in the basic income tax rate.
In Figure 5, the post-reform schedule (the hashed line) is everwhere below the ﬁrst
schedule. At equivalent wage rates for all individuals in the sample, aggregate labour
supply reduces following in the increase in taxes. At the observed distribution of
wages, the average reduction in labour supply is around 0.36 hours (equivalent to
around 2%).19
19This might appear relatively small when compared with an apparent reduction of around 7 per
cent in the marginal wage (from wi(1 − 0.2) to wi(1 − 0.25) for a basic rate taxpayer). However,
on closer inspection this tax rate is not realised for all who do not pay tax (those on low incomes
and not in work). Moreover, the overall percentage change in net income is much lower than 7 per
cent when account is taken of tax-free thresholds and higher tax rates (which remain unchanged
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aggregate elasticity after shift
Figure 6: Simulated Aggregate Wage Elasticities
4.2 Dissagregated Supply Response Schedules
The multi-stage method of generating aggregate supply response schedules may be
extended to simulate the average labour supply responses of particular demographic
groups, as suggested above. By averaging the same individual responses over target
groups within the sample, rather than over the sample as a whole, it is possible to
generate and compare a series of aggregate supply response schedules. Tables 2 to
4 show a series of comparative schedules. In each case, the left-hand panel shows
the supply schedule and the right-hand panel translates these responses into average
wage elasticities.
Table 2 shows the comparative aggregate supply schedules of high- and low-
education individuals, displaying systematically higher labour supply on average
among the higher educated group (in part as a consequence of combining simulated
non-participants with workers in the empirical schedules).20 The implied pattern
of empirical wage elasticities is reversed, with higher elasticities among the low-
education group. This could be a manifestation of Heckman’s (1993) observation
20The high-education group corresponds to those with more than the basic (compulsory) level of
education. This comparison was designed to proxy the relative supply response schedules of high
and low skill labour in the absence of observations on skill levels for non-working individuals in our
sample.
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elasticity after shift (all)
aggregate elasticity (single parents)
elasticity after shift (single parents)
simulated elasticities
that higher labour supply responses are found at the extensive (participation) mar-
gin.
Table 3 compares the average supply responses of sole parents with those of the
full sample. Average labour supply is systematically lower, a function in part of lower
participation rates among sole parents than among other groups in the population.
The shift in the aggregate supply response schedule for sole parents is proportionately
larger, reﬂecting an increased sensitivity among this group to changes in the net wage.
This fact is borne out by a comparison of empirical wage elasticities, showing increased
wage elasticities among sole parent households as wage rates fall (equivalently, as
income tax rates rise). Similar comparative patterns emerge when comparing the
aggregate supply responses of women and men, as shown in Table 4.
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aggregate elasticity (women)
elasticity after shift (women)
simulated elasticities
4.3 Simulating Wage Responses to a Policy Change
The previous section described a method by which to simulate the proportional eﬀects
on the wage distribution following a shift in the aggregate supply schedule. Under
assumptions regarding the equivalent aggregate labour demand schedule, the inter-
sections of simulated demand and supply might be used to model the extent to which
wages might adjust followong a policy reform. With inelastic labour demand, the
extent of the proportionate shift in wage rates could be simulated by measuring the
horizontal distance i∗
max between the two aggregate supply schedules at the pre-reform
level of aggregate supply; see Figure 3. With a ﬂexible demand response schedule,
the full eﬀect of the policy reform comprises shifts both in the wage distribution and
in the equilibrium level of supply/demand; see Figure 4. We consider both cases in
our empirical simulations.21
For the empirical simulations described earlier, the third-round eﬀects of the 5
percentage point increase in income tax can be measured under alternative hypo-
thetical speciﬁcations of aggregate labour demand. We consider two alternatives in
particular; the ﬁrst assumes that demand is completely inelastic, so that Ld(iw)=L0
in the earlier formulation. The second assumes that Ld(iw)=L0.(1+iw)εd with elas-
ticity εd =0 .5, a central ﬁgure in the range of labour demand elasticities typically
reported in the empirical literature.22
21For illustration, we combine the aggregate supply response schedule with a constant elasticity
aggregate demand schedule of the form Ld(iw)=L0.(1 + iw)εd,w h e r eεd represents the aggregate
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Figure 8: Aggregate Demand and Supply Response Schedule: detail
18Table 5: First, Second and Third Round Eﬀects of Tax Reform
Percentage change in: First round Second round Third round
εd =0 εd =0 .5
Income tax revenue +9.1% +7.9% +13.4% +11.7%
Allowance costs - +2.8% -0.5% +0.1%
Aggregate labor supply - -1.9% -0.1% -1.0%
Wage rates - - +3.7% +2.1%
Figure 7 shows the simulated aggregate supply response schedule, which applies to
all individuals combined, and an aggregate demand schedule with elasticity εd =0 .5.
Figure 8 shows the relevant detail of the earlier ﬁgure, focussing on the locality of
the intersection. For an inelastic labour demand schedule, the wage eﬀect i∗
max is
measured to be around 3.7 per cent (the horizontal distance between the aggregate
supply response and supply shift schedules, measured from the point of intersection of
the pre-reform labour supply schedule at iw =0 ).23 The second scenario assumes that
labour demand is responsive to changes in the wage distribution, with an elasticity
of 0.5. From Figure 8, we are able to measure the eﬀect of the microsimulated tax
policy change on wages and labour supply/demand under the assumption of a clearing
labour market. The third-round response combines a simulated increase of 2.07 per
cent in the wage distribution, and a reduction of 1.0 per cent in aggregate labour
supply.
To summarise the successive eﬀects of a change in the tax system, Table 5 shows
the ﬁrst, second and third round eﬀects of the hypothetical increase from 20 to 25
p e rc e n ti nt h eb a s i cr a t eo fi n c o m et a x ,u s i n gt h eJ a n u a r y2 0 0 0A u s t r a l i a nt a xs y s -
tem for the benchmark. The percentage change in income tax revenues, aggregate
labour supply and wages at the three stages of simulation described in this paper,
are reported.24 For the third round eﬀects, results are reported for inelastic labour
demand (providing an upper limit to the potential wage response) and for an aggre-
gate demand elasticity of 0.5 (providing a more central simulation of the potential
wage response).
The ﬁrst column of Table 5 shows only the ﬁrst round eﬀects of the income
23This is obviously an extreme assumption. Nevertheless, i∗
max provides a useful basis from which
to judge the likely wage response to some tax policy reform.
24To get third-round estimates of the percentage change in income tax revenues and allowance
costs, the simulated shift in the wage distribution is fed back into the detailed behavioural microsim-
ulation process. This produces costs which adjust for the combined behavioural response to the tax
increase and the simulated wage eﬀect.
19tax increase, with income tax revenues increasing by around 9 per cent. With no
behavioural responses factored into the simulation, this is the only eﬀect that a static
microsimulation model predicts. The second column includes labour supply responses
in the simulation. As reported in earlier sections, labour supply is predicted to reduce
on average by 1.9 per cent in response to this tax reform. These behavioural responses
have further eﬀects on revenues and costs to the government; the reduction in labour
supply results in a lower increase in income tax revenues than in the ﬁrst-round
simulation (from 9.1 per cent to 7.9 per cent). There is an increase in the cost of
allowance payments, of around 2.8 per cent, as earnings fall.
The ﬁnal column of Table 5 shows how the earlier responses might change following
potential adjustments in the distribution of wage rates. For a perfectly inelastic
labour demand schedule, the shift in aggregate supply results in a proportionate
increase of around 3.7 per cent in the distribution of wage rates. Feeding these
wage increases back into an adjusted behavioural simulation, income tax revenues
rise by 13.4 per cent compared with the status quo. The cost of allowance transfers
actually falls by 0.5 per cent, since earnings increase with the adjustment in wages.
As expected, aggregate labour supply remains eﬀectively unchanged relative to the
s t a t u sq u o ,a si si m p l i e db yt h ea s s u m p t i o no faﬁxed level of labour demand.25 With
an aggregate labour demand elasticity of 0.5, the adjustment is less extreme. Wage
rates are modelled to increase by 2.1 per cent, and aggregate labour supply falls by
around 1 per cent overall. These eﬀects combine to generate an increase of 11.7 per
cent in the revenue from income tax, and an increase of 0.1 per cent in the cost of
allowances.
So far, the results do not disaggregate the sample into demographic or other
groups, so the same percentage wage change is applied to all individuals. Our method
does not prevent the simulation of disaggregated wage eﬀects, however. Suppose that
the labour market comprises high- and low-education workers, with aggregate supply
response schedules as shown in Table 2. Suppose further that there exist separate
sectoral demands for high- and low-education labour. To illustrate the potential
to simulate sectoral wage responses, we parameterise constant-elasticity aggregate
demand schedules for high- and low-education workers, with elasticities of 0.3 and 1.0
respectively.26 These schedules are shown in the top panel of Table 6. Separate wage
25The wage adjustment model sketched here is only one among a range of possible labour market
models, many of which include embellishments on the basic clearing labour market assumption
(such as search-theoretic models, insider-outsider/eﬃciency wage/wage curve models which factor
unemployment into the market structure). The method proposed in this paper can be extended
naturally to alternative models of labour market adjustment.
26Again, elasticities are chosen for illustration only. Nevertheless, the choice of elasticities is
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21eﬀects for each education group may be measured using the approach adopted for the
earlier example. Focussing on the two localities of intersection (as shown in the second
row of Table 6), the third-round eﬀects of the shift in aggregate supply comprise
(i) a 2.3 per cent increase in the wage distribution for high-education workers; (ii)
a 1.6 per cent increase in the wage distribution for low-education workers; (iii) a
reduction of 0.7 per cent in the demand for high-education labour; and (iv) a 1.6
per cent reduction in aggregate demand for low-education workers. As before, these
sectoral wage shifts may be included in an second behavioural simulation in order that
simulated government costs and revenues may be adjusted to account for diﬀerential
supply responses.
5 Conclusions
The main aim of this paper has been to extend behavioural microsimulation mod-
elling so that third round eﬀects of a policy change can be simulated; these allow
for endogenous changes to the distribution of wage rates resulting from the labour
supply responses to tax changes. This has been achieved by the introduction of
the concept of the aggregate supply response schedule which identiﬁe st h ee x t e n tt o
which average labour supply responds to a proportional change in wage rates. Fur-
ther disaggregation, by using supply response schedules for particular demographic
or education groups, provides the possibility of introducing an endogenous change
to the form of the distribution of wage rates as well as shifts, since diﬀerent groups
may experience diﬀerent types of labour supply response to a given tax change, and
therefore experience diﬀerent endogenous wage rate changes.
The use of the concept of the aggregate supply response schedule was illustrated
using the behavioural microsimulation model of the Australian economy (MITTS),
in which an increase in a marginal income tax rate reduces labour supply in the
second round and consequently raises wages. Using a range of assumptions regarding
the pattern of aggregate demand, we simulated increases of up to 3.7 per cent in
the distribution of wage rates over the sample. After re-running MITTS with a
suitable modiﬁcation to individuals’ wage rates, the third-round eﬀects were found to
generate substantially larger increases in income tax revenue than were suggested by
initial non-behavioural costings. The results demonstrated the potential importance
of allowing for such third round eﬀects in microsimulation.
It is suggested that the approach, and the associated concept of the supply re-
consistent with the view of Borjas (2000) that aggregate demand elasticities are typically lower for
high-skilled workers than for low-skilled labour.
22sponse schedule, can be extended to encompass a wide range of labour market ad-
justment models. This oﬀers considerable scope for further research.
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